We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of

Result #1

We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of the viewer to be interested in these likely to be interesting and interesting is not equivalent to the possibility of a relevant similarity. On the other hand, I think it is clear that what we experience as representation is a culturally conditioned habit response . In that sense, a place like Los Angeles is a space of possibility —a place for us to be and to feel a certain connection to other people. I think its a mistake to read this as a critique of the perceived affinity between the art world and the world of commerce, but I wouldnt be too surprised if the New York art world were to see this way. The fact is, its a matter of finding a way to make art that is as accessible as any other form of communication. And that means finding a way to make art that is also as accessible as the world of commerce.The art world is not exactly an ideal place for anyone to meet, but it isnt the problem. We might find a way to meet each other, and the art world is no exception. As Ive said before, its a matter of finding a way to make art that is accessible to everyone. The art world is a place for the sale of goods. Its a market that needs no other form of identification, and its a good one. In that respect, the art world is not necessarily an ideal place for anybody to meet. We need to find a way to make art that is accessible to all. In that respect, the art world is not necessarily a place for everyone.In any case, the New York art world is not necessarily a place for everyone.

Result #2

We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of the viewer that a clearly marked style is somehow beside the point because it is only the fact of it that counts. The artist has said that he wants the painting to look as if it were made by a child and he s given the task of making it look like that, but he seems to think that, in order to be art, it must be an act of love. This is a very different way of making art than the way the Minimalists made art. The Minimalists had to paint as if they were making it, and they did so by an act of love that was, in fact, extremely close to childlike. The contemporary artist is made to feel that his or her work is a tribute to a childhood, a love of the past, and, conversely, that it is the artist who is making it, and that, if that is so, it is because he or she is an artist who knows what he or she is doing. This is a message that is being heard in the contemporary art world. It is also being received in the art world, and perhaps being received in this way, it is not just a matter of a private love for the past but of a public love for art as a whole.The paintings in this show are, as one might expect, paintings on canvas, and they are all about the same size as a standard painting, but they are not hung in the same way as a painting. They are not, however, hung as paintings, but are made of aluminum, which gives them a feeling of solidity and makes them appear to be there. They are also covered with a surface of sand that looks like a kind of paper, and the sand is very small. They are not painted on, but rather painted over, and there is no attempt at paint application.

Result #3

We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of the viewer that the work is recognizable as an element of a given subject would seem more important than the fact that it is recognizable as an element of a particular subject.In an interview, Murray wrote that in a way the esthetic reaction is more important than the esthetic reaction itself. In other words, Murray seems to say that the esthetic reaction is important because it is a spontaneous, subjective response to an objective form. In fact, the esthetic reaction is the result of a conscious, deliberate response to an objective form. This is not to suggest that the esthetic reaction is always the best response to an objective form. Rather, it is the esthetic response that determines the esthetic response. This is the only way in which the esthetic reaction can be a true esthetic response. And it is this difference that Murray is referring to in her painting. The esthetic reaction is an activity that is transparently and immediately recognizable as an activity, and the esthetic reaction is a sign of the recognition of this fact. In the end, however, the esthetic response is a sign of the fact that an activity is, for Murray, a very personal response to an objective form. The esthetic response is a response that can be recognized by its own recognition. The esthetic response is a response that is, in a sense, a subjective response to an objective form. The esthetic response is the recognition of the fact that the esthetic form has, by virtue of the fact that it is a subjective response, been recognized as an element of a subject. The esthetic response is thus a response that can be experienced in a very personal way, and this is what constitutes the esthetic reaction. The esthetic reaction is an activity that is transparently and immediately recognizable as an activity, and the esthetic response is a sign of the recognition of this fact.

Result #4

We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of such a thing would be as unverifiable as an artist as a painter. The difficulty is that to say something is to say something and to say something is to say something that is arbitrary and unverifiable. The necessity for a subject matter is to be self-evident. The necessity for an aesthetic notion is to be an objective representation of an objective reality. But the necessity of an aesthetic idea is that of a natural or logical representation of reality, i.e. of reality as an absolute. It is the difference between an art of art and an art of matter. The former is a representation of the world, the latter a representation of the world as a representation of an object. This is a difference that can be found in the classical image of the picture, which finds its source in the real world. But the difference between the two is that, whereas in classical painting the world is represented by the natural world, in sculpture the world is represented by the human figure. The classical figure is a figure that has become an object, a figurative element of representation, and this fact is a problem for painting. The classical figure is a figure that, in its role as the signifier of the object, has become an objective of resemblance. It is a figure that is both the signifier and the object of a representational or esthetic meaning. It is a figure that is both a sign of and an object of a representation. It is a figure that is itself an esthetic object. It is a figure that is both an object and a sign of an esthetic object. It is a figure that is represented by an esthetic object and an esthetic sign. It is a figure that has become a sign of an esthetic sign and a sign of an esthetic object. It is a figure that is a sign of a representational or esthetic object.

Result #5

We tend to feel that representation works by a recognizable element of objective resemblance, yet it seems more accurate to say that what we experience as representation is, like aesthetic taste, a culturally conditioned habit response not involving objective resemblance. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to say what would constitute objective resemblance. And in reverse, the conviction of any such perception is ultimately mediated by the extent to which the subject is perceived as a trivial experience, a trivial sign. The superficiality of these paintings is very much the case, but they are not the subject of the painting, and the fact that they are taken as paintings is not. The subject is the painting. What the painter wants is a subject that is not a painting, a painting that is not a painting, and thats what he gets.